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Recent Cases on Intoxication 
INTRODUCTION 
Intoxication of a plaintiff raises many issues in a negligence action – duty of care, breach of duty, 
causation and the defence of contributory negligence.  Recently intoxication has been examined by the 
Full Court of Tasmania in relation to duty and breach and by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 
respect of causation and contributory negligence. 
SCOTT V CAL NO 14 PTY LTD (NO 2) T/AS TANDARA MOTOR INN 
In Scott v Cal No 14 Pty Ltd (No 2) t/as Tandara Motor Inn [20009] TASSC 2 (19 January 2009), the 
Tasmanian Full Court heard an appeal on the issue of whether an operator of a hotel and its licensee 
owed a duty of care in negligence to an intoxicated patron and whether the scope of that duty included 
preventing the intoxicated patron from leaving the premises on a motor cycle.   
 The facts were, briefly, that Shane Scott was killed when the motor bike he was riding left the road 
and collided with a bridge.  Prior to the fatal accident, Scott had been drinking at Tandara Motor Inn 
and in the time that he was there he consumed approximately eight cans of premixed Jack Daniels and 
cola.  The evidence was that at some time during the evening it was decided that Scott would not drive 
home.  The motor cycle was taken into a storeroom of the hotel and the keys to the bike were placed in 
the petty cash tin.  However, upon the deceased’s request, later the licensee gave back the keys and 
unlocked the storeroom to allow the deceased to get his motor cycle.  The fatal accident occurred 
approximately 10 minutes after the deceased left the hotel riding the motor cycle. 
 Scott’s wife brought an action under the Fatal Accidents Act 1934 (Tas) against the owner of the 
Tandara Motor Inn and the licensee of the hotel.  It was alleged that the defendants had been negligent 
by serving too much alcohol to the deceased and for failing to stop him from riding from the hotel on 
the motor cycle.   
 
DUTY OF CARE 
The trial judge had applied the New South Wales Court of Appeal decision of South Tweed Heads 
Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Cole (2002) 55 NSWLR 113 that a publican’s duty of care to a 
patron does not extend to taking care to ensure that the patron is not harmed by their own intoxication.  
This case went on appeal to the High Court with the result that in Australia there is no general duty of 
care owed to protect patrons from injury arising from their consumption of alcohol.  However, their 
Honours did accept that it may be possible in certain circumstances that the supplier of alcohol may 
come under such a duty.
1
 
 
The Full Court of the Tasmanian Supreme Court allowed an appeal by the plaintiff by a majority of 
2:1.  Evans J, in the majority, referred to the judgment of Gummow J in Roads and Traffic Authority of 
New South Wales v Dederer (2007) 234 CLR 330 at [18]: 
 
 First, the proper resolution of an action in negligence depends upon the existence and scope of the 
relevant duty of care.  Secondly, whatever its scope, a duty of care imposes an obligation to 
exercise reasonable care; it does not impose a duty to prevent potentially harmful conduct.  
Thirdly, the assessment of breach depends on the correct identification of the relevant risk of 
injury.  Fourthly, breach must be assessed prospectively and not retrospectively.  Fifthly, such an 
assessment of breach must be made in the manner described by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v 
Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 at 47-8. 
 
Evans J discussed the High Court decision of Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football 
Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469, but noted that many of the difficulties identified by the 
members of the court in determining the scope of a duty of care did not apply to the case 
before the  Full Court.  At [48] his Honour stated: 
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 See Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469 at [17] per 
Gleeson CJ; at [131] per Callinan J. 
Plainly, as with any relationship that gives rise to a duty of care, the scope of the duty that 
arises from the relationship between an hotelier who provides alcohol and a patron, may 
be extended by the particular circumstances of the case.2 
 
His Honour observed that the relationship between the deceased and the defendants was very different 
to the relationship between the injured plaintiff and the defendant club in Cole v South Tweed Heads 
Rugby League Football Club Ltd.  In this case there were few difficulties in respect of the 
serving of alcohol to the deceased and monitoring his intoxication as the deceased was known 
to the licensee as a regular customer, there was never more than approximately six to eight 
persons in the bar and it was the licensee himself who was serving 30 minutes after the 
deceased entered the bar.  Further, the deceased had involved the defendant as to how he was 
going to travel home.  The licensee had observed the deceased level of intoxication and 
refused further service and it was after this that the deceased changed his mind and decided to 
drive the motor cycle home: see [47].  By assisting in placing the motor cycle in the 
storeroom and taking the keys, the licensee ‘took on a role in relation to the means by which 
Mr Scott was to leave the hotel that night that went way beyond the normal relationship 
between a hotelier selling alcohol and a patron’: at [50]. 
 
A duty of care and its scope also is determined by the nature of the harm: at [51] citing Cole 
at [1]; Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254 at [14]; 
Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424 at 487.  The risk of harm that arises 
from driving a motor vehicle whilst affected by alcohol is personal injury, the very type of 
injury suffered by the deceased.  Therefore in the circumstances a duty of care was owed by 
the hotel and the licensee to take reasonable care to avoid the deceased riding the motor cycle 
when his capacity to ride safely was reduced by his consumption of alcohol: at [53]. 
 
Tennent J also referred to Cole, holding that the circumstances of this case were very 
different: at [75].  Hi s Honour held that a duty of care was owed, noting at [68]: 
 
 It is not, in my view, simply the level of incapacity of [the deceased] as he sought out his 
motor bike which ought to be considered for the purposes of determining whether the 
circumstances of this case give rise to a duty of care.  It is all the circumstances of the 
case, which include the arrangement about the bike and how that came to be, which 
should be considered. 
 
In dissent, Crawford CJ preferred the view of the Court of Appeal in Cole.  At [28] his 
Honour stated: 
 
 To conclude that an actionable duty in negligence was owed in this case requires 
acceptance of the existence of a duty that has not been recognised in a superior court in 
this country other than in Johns v Cosgrove ((1997) 27 MVR 110).  For the reasons given 
by the Court of Appeal [in Cole], an extension of the duty of care is undesirable. 
 
BREACH OF DUTY 
In determining whether there was a breach of the duty, Evans J applied Wyong Shire Council v Shirt.  
On the facts it was reasonably foreseeable that if the licensee failed to take action to prevent the 
deceased from riding that night there was risk that the deceased would suffer injury: at [54].  In 
considering what a reasonable person would have done in the circumstances, it was considered that the 
deceased’s wife could have been called to request that she collect her husband.  As this was the plan at 
the time the motor cycle had been placed in the storeroom, by continuing to serve the deceased with 
alcohol, there was no breach: at [55].  Even when requested by the deceased to return the bike and the 
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 See South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Cole (2002) 55 NSWLR 113 at [97 per 
Ipp JA; Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2004) 217 CLR 469 at [17] per 
Gleeson CJ; at [131] per Callinan J. 
keys, steps could have been taken to delay the deceased while his wife was called, even if this was 
against the wishes of the deceased.  The evidence of the licensee was that there ‘was nothing unusual 
about telephoning the wife of a patron and requesting her to collect her husband from the hotel’ and 
therefore in the circumstances of this case it would have been the reasonable thing to do and failure to 
do so was a breach of the duty of care: at [56]. 
 
Breach was dealt with very simply by Tennent J at [76], holding that by returning the motor cycle to 
allow the deceased to drive was a breach of duty. 
 
JACKSON V LITHGOW CITY COUNCIL 
In Jackson v Lithgow City Council [2008] NSWCA 312 (24 November 2008) the plaintiff was found 
unconscious in a concrete drain in a park.  He suffered serious injuries and sued the council in 
negligence alleging that he had fallen over the low, unfenced retaining wall of the drain.  However, the 
case was complicated by the fact that the plaintiff had no recollection of how he fell down the drain or 
how he came to be at the park and there were no witnesses.  He had been drinking at the Lithgow 
Workman’s Club the afternoon before the accident and had returned home at 1:30am and continued 
drinking.  At 3:30am, as the plaintiff was listening to music, his partner told him to either keep quiet or 
to go for a walk.  The plaintiff did go for a walk, taking his two dogs with him on leads. He was found 
just before 7am.   
 
LACK OF EVIDENCE OF CAUSATION 
Various explanations as to how the plaintiff came to be in the drain were put forward by both parties.  
If the plaintiff had approached the drain from the top of the hill, the low wall created a hazard for 
persons walking at night in the park as the drain was not visible.  The plaintiff asserted that a number of 
factors led to the inference that he had fallen as he walked downhill: at [35].  For example, the evidence 
was that from that direction the drain was obscured at night but if approached from the side it was 
visible; the nature of his injuries suggested a fall from a significant height as opposed to simply 
stumbling down a slope and the direction of his house and the lie of the land would have naturally led 
him to the point. The defendant argued that any conclusion as to how the plaintiff came to be in the 
drain was purely speculative as it was not known if the accident occurred before or after daylight,  
whether he had tripped over the wall, whether he had fallen off the wall as he was standing on it or if 
he had been assaulted.   
 
Due to the lack of evidence, the issue of causation gave rise to problems and inference had to be relied 
upon by the court.  In evidence was a ‘retrieval record’ a contemporaneous document completed by the 
ambulance officers who attended the scene of the accident.  The ambulance officers were not called to 
give evidence but the retrieval record stated ‘fall from 1.5 metres on to concrete’.  The defendant 
sought limitation on the use of the record as it was not evidence of the fact.
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  In coming to the 
conclusion that the plaintiff had not established causation, hat the plaintiff was injured as a result of the 
defendant’s breach of duty, the trial judge did not rely upon the retrieval record. 
 
However, on appeal the retrieval record was given more consideration.  Allsop P thought that the 
retrieval record added to the inference that the plaintiff had approached the drain as he alleged.  At [45] 
it was stated: 
 
[‘fall from 1.5 metres on to concrete’ in the retrieval record] can be taken, on its face, to be the 
conclusion drawn by the ambulance officers as to what had happened, they having the inert 
unconscious body in front of them and they having the advantage of being able to assess the 
position of the body and its relationship with the wall and the drain. 
 
Under the New South Wales evidence legislation, such a statement was to be considered to be a 
statement of the ambulance officers’ opinion as to what had happened: at [47].  Therefore the Court of 
Appeal accepted the inference that the plaintiff had been walking downhill when he fell into the drain 
and injured himself.   The trial judge had accepted that if this approach had been taken, a person in the 
park at night would not have seen the drain and would have fallen in.  But as the defendant contested, 
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 See Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) s 136 which gives a discretion to the court to exclude or limit evidence 
if its value as evidence is outweighed by the risk that it may be prejudicial to a party.  There is no 
equivalent in the Queensland legislation. 
there was no evidence as to when the plaintiff had fallen – at night in the dark or after sunrise.  Allsop 
P took into account that the plaintiff had been told by his partner to go for a walk at 3:30am and 
concluded at [51]: 
 
In all the circumstances, given that the appellant appears to have left home at 3.30 am to take 
the dogs for a walk, it is unlikely from human experience that he remained out in the chill of a 
Lithgow winter morning for somewhat over three hours before falling over the wall. It is far 
more likely, in my view, if one accepts that he fell over the wall, that this occurred in the dark 
some not-too-lengthy time after leaving home. 
 
And at [53] it was explained: 
 
The inference that the appellant fell over the wall while walking down the hill rather than 
stumbling from the side is assisted because of the ambulance officers' conclusion and the 
greater visibility of the drain from the side. Further, the scale of the appellant's injuries 
appears more consistent with a significant fall of 1.5 metres than stumbling into the shallow 
drain from the side. 
 
It was held that causation could be established and the defendant was liable for the plaintiff’s personal 
injuries. 
 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE 
The trial judge had found that at the time of the accident the plaintiff was intoxicated.  This required 
her to take into account the intoxication provisions of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), in particular, 
s 5O.
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  This section provides: 
 
(1) This section applies when it is established that the person whose death, injury or damage is the 
subject of proceedings for the recovery of damages was at the time of the act or omission that 
caused the death, injury or damage intoxicated to the extent that the person's capacity to 
exercise reasonable care and skill was impaired. 
 
(2)  A court is not to award damages in respect of liability to which this Part applies unless 
satisfied that the death, injury or damage to property (or some other injury or damage to 
property) is likely to have occurred even if the person had not been intoxicated. 
 
(3)  If the court is satisfied that the death, injury or damage to property (or some other injury or 
damage to property) is likely to have occurred even if the person had not been intoxicated, it is 
to be presumed that the person was contributorily negligent unless the court is satisfied that 
the person's intoxication did not contribute in any way to the cause of the death, injury or 
damage. 
 
(4)  When there is a presumption of contributory negligence, the court must assess damages on the 
basis that the damages to which the person would be entitled in the absence of contributory 
negligence are to be reduced on account of contributory negligence by 25% or a greater 
percentage determined by the court to be appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
 
(5)  This section does not apply in a case where the court is satisfied that the intoxication was not 
self-induced.  
 
The trial judge held that if the plaintiff had been approaching the drain downhill, the accident would 
have occurred even if the plaintiff had not been intoxicated.  On appeal, Allsop P considered s 5O and 
held that subsection (3) applied in the circumstances as it could not be concluded that the plaintiff’s 
intoxication had not contributed to the fall over the wall and into the drain: at [104].  The defendant 
argued that the reduction under subsection (4) should be 50%, but Allsop P held that the mandatory 
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 Section 47 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) differs to the New South Wales provision as it 
presumes contributory negligence if the plaintiff was intoxicated at the time of the accident.  The 
presumption may be rebutted if the plaintiff proves that the intoxication did not contribute to the 
breach of duty: s 47(3)(a). 
25% was the correct reduction as he fell into a drain that even a sober person would not have seen: at 
[105]. 
 
The plaintiff’s appeal was allowed, Basten JA and Grove J concurring with the judgment of Allsop P. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Cases involving intoxication continue to raise issues despite the High Court majority decision of Cole 
in 2004 and the intoxication provision in the civil liability legislation.   
 
Jackson v Lithgow City Council is an unusual case on negligence where causation was an issue for the 
reason that there was no actual proof of how the plaintiff came to fall into the drain and injure himself.  
On the evidence before the court, inference favoured the intoxicated plaintiff and the council was held 
liable with a reduction in damages to acknowledge the plaintiff’s intoxication at the time of being 
injured.  
 
Cole had been reassurance for licensed premises that no general duty was owed to prevent intoxicated 
patrons from leaving the premises.  As Gleeson CJ stated at [18]: ‘The consequences [of such a duty of 
care] involve both an unacceptable burden upon ordinary social and commercial behaviour, and an 
unacceptable shifting of responsibility for individual choice.’  Scott v Cal No 14 Pty Ltd (No 2) will 
give smaller hoteliers pause to think when serving patrons with whom they may have some sort of 
relationship with.  If they are actively involved in the decision process of how a patron may be leaving 
the premises, there is the possibility under the reasoning of Scott that they will be liable in negligence.  
To avoid liability the hotelier will have to take reasonable steps to prevent the patron from driving, for 
example, as was suggested in Scott, phoning the patron’s partner if they are known to the hotelier. 
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